Sui Generis Intellectual Property Law Reform: Issues for Australia by Richardson, Megan
19 
SUI GENERIS INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW REFORM: ISSUES FOR 
AUSTRALIA 
Megan Richardson * 
This article begins by describing the current range of intellectual property rights in Australia 
(statutory and common law/equity), then canvasses recent reforms that seek to address some of the 
problems raised by new innovation practices.  A particular focus of the article is the piecemeal nature 
of the law reform process which continues to treat the law in this area in a highly compartmentalised 
fashion.  Some tentative proposals for improvement are made at the end. 
I INTRODUCTION 
While skeptics have wondered aloud whether intellectual property rights are really 
necessary in order to stimulate innovation (or whether the costs are worth the benefits), the 
overwhelming anecdotal evidence now appears to be that proprietary rights in information 
produced by "sweat of the brow" are not only desirable but sometimes essential. 1 There are 
many apocalyptical stories of innovators being the first to develop a new product or process 
but unable to participate in the profits that were subsequently generated. The experience of 
EMI, the original producer of the CAT scanner, for which its scientist won a Nobel prize, who 
* Associate Professor, Law Faculty, The University of Melbourne.  Before joining the law faculty I was a 
Senior Legal Research Officer at the Law Commission, New Zealand.  I am grateful to Chris Creswell, 
Consultant, Attorney­General's Department, Canberra, and Sam Ricketson, Professor, Monash 
University, for helpful information and advice in the drafting of this article. This article is current as at 
30 November 2000. 
1 See further M Richardson, J Gans, F Hanks and P Williams The Benefits and Costs of Copyright: An 
Economic Perspective (Centre for Copyright Studies, Sydney, 2000).
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lost its position in the market within 8 years is one. 2 Other examples include Bowmar, who 
introduced the pocket calculator, Xerox who invented the office computer only to find many 
of its features copied by Apple, and – to use a recent Australian example ­ Philips who within 
a few years of introducing the long­life light­bulb onto the Australian market found the 
market swamped by cheaper copies. 3 First­mover advantages count for something so 
innovators may not lose out completely.   But, without legal proprietary protection, their 
success depends on a host of other skills which many small players in particular may not 
have and even large players may singularly lack.   For many if not most innovators, the two 
most important "environmental factors" conditioning their success are the efficacy of legal 
protection mechanisms and the nature of their technology. 4 If the technology is inherently 
capable of exclusivity legal proprietary protection may not be needed.  But if codified rather 
than tacit information is the norm, intellectual property rights become increasingly significant 
to the innovator's ability to appropriate the economic benefits arising from their innovations. 
Given that starting point, there is a real question whether the various intellectual property 
systems that are currently available in Anglo­Australian jurisdictions are sufficiently broad to 
respond to the needs of innovators; and, further, whether the law reform process is 
sufficiently well adapted to enable the law to develop sufficiently speedily to keep up with 
the demands of new innovation practices. 
In the following sections of this paper, I begin by canvassing the scope of the current 
systems;  then consider some of the features of new innovation practices which have tested 
their boundaries; and the trend of  reforms which have sought to deal with these.  At the end 
I make some tentative proposals for future intellectual property law reform. 
2 These and other stories are recounted by D Teece in his article "Capturing Value from Innovation" 
[1991] Les Nouvelles 21.  See also D Teece "Profiting From Technological Innovation" in D Teece (ed) 
The Competitive Challenge: Strategies for Industrial Innovation and Renewal (Ballinger Pub, Cambridge 
(MS), 1987) 185. 
3 The Mirabella lamp was introduced onto the Australian market in 1990, some 2 years after the Philips 
lamp was available in commercial quantities, at a price of approximately 2/3 the price of the Philips 
original: for the ensuing litigation see NV Philips  v Mirabella International Pty Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 655. 
4 Teece, above n 2 – or at least in the present climate of limited government expenditure on direct 
financial support for innovation.
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II THE CURRENT MENU OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS 
The main features of the existing intellectual property systems are set out in tabular form 
in an Appendix to this paper.  Briefly they can be summarised as follows.  First, there are the 
common law and equitable rights that support self­help measures of protection.  These 
include contract law and the equitable doctrine of breach of confidence which protect the 
secrecy of information during the development and commercialisation phase of a new 
product or process (although their value is obviously greatest for tacit information which can 
be kept "secret"); 5 as well as the law of passing off supplemented by the doctrine of 
misleading or deceptive conduct under s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). 6 These 
offer a certain scope of protection for an innovator's commercial reputation against 
misrepresentations that another trader's goods or services are those of the claimant 7 or there 
is some other association between them, for instance ­ and as is increasingly common in 
recent cases ­ sponsorship or approval. 8 The last development in particular has led to a new 
energy for these laws protecting commercial reputation. 
Beyond that, there are the usual regulatory systems of intellectual property protection. 9 
Copyright law grants rights over original works ("works" now defined in the Copyright Act 
1968 (Cth) to cover virtually anything which has a material expression, including computer 
5 So, for instance, a product that can be reverse engineered on the market to reveal its secrets stands little 
chance of protection: as the plaintiff found to its cost in a recent UK case: Mars UK Ltd v Teknowledge Ltd 
(1999) 46 IPR 248 (EWHC). 
6 Section 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) provides that "a corporation shall not, in trade or 
commerce, engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive" (and 
there are also parallel provisions not limited to corporations in the Australian State and Territory Fair 
Trading Acts). 
7 See Reckitt & Coleman Ltd v Bordern Inc [1990] RPC 341 (HL).  For equivalent scope attributed to the 
operation of s 52, see Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 191. 
8 Passing off was articulated in broad terms of misrepresentation of association by the House of Lords in 
the Advocaat case: Erven Warnink BV v Townend [1979] AC 731 (HL).  But arguments regarding 
sponsorship or approval have been taken particularly far in Australia, now endorsed by the High Court 
(the use of the famous Nike label held to pass off and breach s 52 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) when 
adopted for the defendant's sports perfume) Campomar Soc Ltd  v Nike International Ltd (2000) 46 IPR 481 
(HCA). 
9 The main systems are discussed below.  Other even more tailored systems are the Circuit Layouts Act 
1989 (Cth) and the Plant Breeder's Rights Act 1994 (Cth).
22 (2001) 32 VUWLR 
programs, as a species of "literary work") 10 and related subject­matter including published 
editions, films and broadcasts; whereas patent law covers "inventions" (defined in the Patents 
Act 1990 (Cth) as "any manner of new manufacture the subject of letters patent and the grant 
of privilege within section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies"). 11 Subsidiary rights over designs 
apply under the Designs Act 1906 (Cth) – although the term "design" is misleading here since 
protection in Australia is still confined to features of appearance of industrial articles. 12 The 
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) grants rights in "trade marks", covering "signs" including shape, 
sound or scent that distinguish a trader's goods or services from those of other traders in the 
market place. 13 The Act also extends its remedial provisions beyond the use of deceptively 
similar trade marks for registered goods or services (traditionally the focus of statutory trade 
mark law) to cover also other uses that are likely to deceive or confuse or will diminish the 
value of a trade mark that is "well known" in Australia. 14 The broad scope of this Act in 
extending to trade mark "dilution" was largely driven by Australia's adherence to the 
Agreement on Trade­Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 1994. 15 
There are also exceptions and limitations to the statutory rights including, in the case of 
copyright, rather narrowly defined exceptions for "fair dealings" 16 and rather more 
elaborately defined statutory licence schemes covering for, for instance, copying by 
10 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), s 10(1), although even before that the High Court had accepted that source 
code could be a literary work: Computer Edge Pty Ltd v Apple Computer Inc (1986) 161 CLR 171. 
11 Patents Act 1990 (Cth), Sch 1.  For that term interpreted by the High Court in an early case to require a 
"useful" and "vendible product" and, more specifically, an "artificially created state of affairs" that 
would not otherwise exist see NRDC v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252. 
12 Designs Act 1906, s 4. 
13 Trade Marks Act 1995, s 17; and see 6 for the definition of "sign". 
14 Trade Marks Act 1995, s 120(3) and see for a brief discussion Campomar v Nike, above n 8,  493­494. 
Judgment of the Court. 
15 Agreement on Trade­Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (1994).  This well known 
Agreement which was signed as an Annex to the Uruaguay Round of the GATT negotiations is binding 
on members of the World Trade Organisations and sets minimal standards for not only trade mark law 
but also copyright (adopting and supplementing the standards of the Berne Convention) and patent 
and design laws. 
16 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), ss 40­43, 103A­C.  Certain specific exceptions also apply to decompilation of 
computer programs (eg for error correction, to establish interoperability) in new provisions enacted at 
the end of 1999: Copyright Act 1968 ss 47B­H.
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educational institutions administered by the collecting societies. 17 More generally, of course, 
ideas are regarded as outside the scope of protection accorded to copyright works.  And the 
fact that the law is mostly concerned with reproduction and some types of dissemination 
provides an additional constraint on ownership rights notwithstanding the, admittedly very 
long, period of protection. 18 In the case of patents and designs, the balance of interests can be 
found in requirement for disclosure of the invention or design, free use after limited term of 
protection (recently increased to 20 years for standard patents following TRIPs) 19 and 
compulsory licensing of inventions permitted when the innovation is not properly exploited 20 
although this is rarely actually taken up in practice. Trade mark protection is premised on the 
basis of use of the trade mark as a trade mark and satisfaction of requirements for registration 
including no likelihood of deception or confusion and sufficient distinctiveness. 21 In addition 
factors arising after registration leading to likely confusion or genericism may also provide a 
basis for rectification of a trade mark lawfully registered. 22 The interests of competing trade 
mark users are protected through provisions permitting prior and honest concurrent users to 
use and even register their trade marks; 23 and other "good faith" exceptions apply to the 
exclusiveness of a registered owner's rights. 24 
There are obviously benefits to these regulatory systems of protection in providing wider 
and more security than any of the self­help based regimes ­ and the patent and design 
systems provide the extra security above copyright law of a registered right, permitting a 
17 For instance (photocopying by educational institutions): Part VB. 
18 Generally 50 years from the year of the author's death for a published copyright work and otherwise 
from the year of first publication: Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), ss 33­34.  Shorter periods apply for subject­ 
matter other than works and performances. 
19 The patent term for a standard patent now 20 years from the patent date (with possibility of extension 
for pharmaceutical patents); and up to 6 years for a petty patent); Patents Act 1990 (Cth), ss 67­68.  The 
maximum term for a registered design is 16 years: Designs Act, s 27A. 
20 Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 133 onwards. 
21 Trade marks Act 1995 (Cth), ss 41, 43­44, s 60 especially.  For rectification of a registered trade mark 
permitted on the basis that it should not originally have been registered: see also s 88(2)(a). 
22 Trade marks Act 1995 (Cth), ss 87, 88 (2)(c), although note an exception applies to these grounds for 
cases in which the ground did not arise through any "act or fault" of the registered owner. 
23 Trade marks Act 1995 (Cth), s 44. 
24 See defences to infringement set out in Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth), s 122­124.
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certain degree of "monopoly" protection in preventing even independent development. 25 
This registered monopoly protection is seen as especially valuable in the case of patent law 
which is the only one of the three registration systems which has the protection of functional 
­ ie useful ­innovation as its immediate purpose (even though the protection of function is not 
actually precluded under any of the systems). 26 But on the other hand copyright has the 
distinct advantage of being broad­encompassing.  For a start this covers an extraordinarily 
wide variety of literary, dramatic, musical and artistic "works" and related subject­matter 
whose only common purpose may be "to provide information and instruction, or pleasure". 27 
Similarly, the standard of originality is set very low at "skill and labour" 28 and protection for 
other subject­matter is not premised on originality at all. Further, copyright is not dependent 
on formal steps of registration being taken and is automatically international in its effect. 
Once protection is derived in one country which is a member of the wide­ranging Berne 
Convention or the TRIPs Agreement ­ which Australia is, as most of the world's countries are 
­ it automatically extends within the others as well on equivalent terms. 29 Each of the 
statutory intellectual property systems has its strength as well as its weaknesses as far as 
innovators are concerned.   But they seem to provide more clear and certain protection of 
innovation per se than any of the common law and equitable systems which operate within 
confined boundaries that may have little to do with the character or value of the innovation 
concerned. 
For these reasons, even when common law and equitable self help measures may be 
available, an innovator may well prefer one or more of the regulatory systems of protection 
25 As the Acts explicitly state: Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 13 (patent gives "exclusive rights, during the term 
of the patent, to exploit the invention"); Designs Act 1906, s 25 the owner of a registered design has a 
monopoly in that design".  Note however Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 119 which provides an exception to 
infringement for a prior continuous user of the (undisclosed) invention. 
26 And the Designs Act 1906 (Cth) states that the fact that a design is functional does not preclude its 
registration: s 18(1). 
27 See, for this standard used to define a literary work, in particular: Exxon Corporation v Exxon Insurance 
[1982] Ch 119, 143 (CA) per Stephenson LJ. 
28 See Data Access Corp v Powerflex Services Pty Ltd (1999) 45 IPR 353, 375 (HCA).  See also for an historical 
discussion of the originality concept under Anglo­Australian law, S Ricketson The Law of Intellectual 
Property: Copyright, Designs & Confidential Information (Law Book Company, Australia, 1999) ch 7 at 
7.35­7.105. 
29 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), s 184 and Copyright (International Protection) Regulations.
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notwithstanding the tradeoffs prescribed in the particular intellectual property "bargain" 
prescribed under the statute.  Copyright and patent – being the broadest in subject­matter 
scope – have in Australia, as elsewhere, emerged as the dominant systems for intellectual 
property protection in the latter part of the 20 th century.  However, they are under increasing 
pressure. 
III RECENT TRENDS IN INNOVATION PRACTICES 
In the last quarter of the 20 th century there have been some important developments in 
innovation practices which raise fundamental questions about the established boundaries of 
the existing laws.  Before, the different systems of protection may not have been ideally suited 
to all the major categories of innovation but their rough and ready dividing lines were 
basically sufficient. 30 Now the logic of the dividing lines between the formal categories of 
protection that we inherited from an earlier age have been blown apart the realities of the 
new "information age". 
Most spectacular here is the shift from tacit to codified information that new technology 
has facilitated and encouraged. As Ergas has recently observed: 31 
[T]he recent period has been characterised by the dramatic expansion in that share of knowledge 
which is codified relative to that which is not. 
In part, this trend reflects compositional shifts in the pattern of inventive activity.  A much greater 
share of invention today involves software, which of its nature comes in codified form. 
Additionally, the revolution in biology has increased the share of innovations arising in the life 
sciences.  These are areas which have always been very close to applied science, and in which 
knowledge lends itself to formulaic description. 
However, it is not only compositional shifts that are at work.  Rather, and perhaps even more 
interestingly, areas of knowledge that were traditionally regarded as tacit are now ceasing to be so, 
as codification spreads to even greater parts of the technology base … Perhaps the most significant 
reason for this change is the ever more widespread use of IT in the innovation process … 
30 Compare J Reichman "Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms" (1994) 94 Colum L 
Rev  2432; P Samuelson, R Davis, M Kapor & JH Reichman "A Manifesto Concerning the Legal 
Protection of Computer Programs" (1994) 94 Col L Rev 2308. 
31 H Ergas "Changes in the Science and Technology System and Some of Their Implications for the 
Protection of Intellectual Property" (1999) 39 IP Forum 28.
26 (2001) 32 VUWLR 
While tacit information was particularly well suited to protection under contract and 
confidentiality laws, codification of information raises the question of whether the security of 
information needs to be more broadly protected against all forms of unauthorised access and 
use. Couple this with the Internet which has wrought fundamental changes in the processes 
available for diffusing information.  The Internet makes diffusion of codified information 
very easy. 32 But at the same time codified information, travelling in small packages through 
complex interrelated networks across national boundaries can be intercepted and 
appropriated by others in ways that can be difficult to monitor or prevent. 33 Given all this it 
is not surprising that even sophisticated technological self­help measures have proved 
inadequate to protect the security of information, placing more and more pressure on the 
statutory systems to provide legal support where previously this may not have been needed. 
34 
Codification is not the only issue though.  A blurring of the formerly clearer dividing lines 
between form and function is also a feature of new information products. 35 Digital 
information is a particular example of information that transcends the form­function divide 
that separates copyright, design and trade mark law on the one hand ­ and patent law on the 
other.  It is concerned both with the expression of ideas and with achieving highly utilitarian 
outcomes. It is "literary" in the sense that it is informative and instructive but it is also 
functional in the sense that it has a clear utilitarian purpose (instructing a computer to 
perform certain actions that otherwise would have to be performed mechanically) which may 
actually make copyright 
32 For an account of the impact of the Internet as a new form of "architecture" on the generation, 
distribution and appropriation of information, see L Lessig "The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw 
Might Teach" (1999) 113 Harv L Rev 501. 
33 As pointed out by D Lindsay Copyright Infringement Via the Internet DP No 11 (Centre for Media, 
Communications and Information Technology Law, May 2000) 9­11. 
34 See, for instance, copyright cases Trumpet Software v Ozemail Pty Ltd (1996) 34 IPR 481 (FCA) where the 
defendant had downloaded the plaintiff's shareware off the Internet (before the timelock was 
introduced) in order to publish it to subscribers to its computer magazine; Autodesk v Dyason (1992) 173 
CLR 330 where the operation of the plaintiff's locking mechanism was investigated through an 
oscilloscope, the defendant's software effectively reproduced the unlocking function; and (pleading 
breach of copyright as well as breach of confidence) Mars UK Ltd v Teknowledge Ltd, above n 5, where 
even encryption of the plaintiff's EEPROM was insufficient to prevent reverse engineering. 
35 See M Richardson "Australian Intellectual Property Law: The Form/Function Dilemma: A Case Study 
at the Boundaries of Trade Mark and Design Law" [2000] 7 EIPR 314.
SUI GENERIS INTELLECTUALPROPERTY LAW REFORM: ISSUES FOR AUSTRALIA 27 
protection quite problematic. 36 Unauthorised "reproduction" is not so much the issue as 
unauthorised use; yet the information product is not innovative enough for the most part to 
justify protection against independent development under the rigorous standards of the 
current patent regime. 37 Finally, although the work of an author or authors, the product 
relies on a significant degree of technological input, entails little or no "moral" element of 
personality and, one might think, hardly justifies a term of protection of years calculated 
beyond the death of the author.  It was TRIPs that ultimately insisted computer software 
should be regarded as a literary work for copyright purposes. 38 But the functional nature of 
the information concerned means that it truly tests the boundaries of copyright law. 39 
High cost and high risk are also features of the new information age, notable for some 
major international research projects aimed at fundamental breakthroughs at a level never 
before experienced.  The biggest of these is the Human Genome Project began in 1990 as a 
$US3 billion, 15 year coordinated effort of scientific teams from around the world to identify 
the estimated 100,000 or more human genes that make up the human genome with enormous 
anticipated medical and other social benefits. 40 For massive projects of this scale funding 
may come from governments as well as private bodies whose preference is to share the 
information publicly once it becomes revealed. 41 Intellectual property rights may not be 
36 So the High Court in Data Access v Powerflex, above n 28, 368­70 determined that even if the 
functionality does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the idea, not the expression, is at stake 
(copyright does not extend to ideas) then there may be other reasons not to protect the information 
under copyright law.  For instance, the plaintiff's computer programming language which did not fall 
within the statutory definition of a "computer program" (in its raw form considered merely to be "data") 
was found to be non­original and also an "insubstantial" work.  Further, although the macros used in 
the plaintiff's application development system, were accepted to be computer programs and thus 
literary works, the defendant's adoption of similar macros for a competing system (which also used the 
same language) was held to simply reproduce the function or "idea" rather than the expression itself. 
37 Although patents are already being granted to some software products.  Here, apparently, Australian 
courts are following the United States trend: C Wood "Patents in Computer Software – Commercially 
Useful is Not Enough" (1998) 9 AIPJ 134; N Stoianoff "Patenting Computer Software: An Australian 
Perspective" [1999] EIPR 500. 
38 TRIPs, art 10(1). 
39 As others have also pointed out: Reichman and Samuelson, Davis, Kapor & Riechman above n 30. 
40 See Human Genome Management Information System "US Human Genome Project 5 Year Research 
Goals 1998­2003" <http://www.ornl.gov/TechResources/Human_Genome/hg5yp/>. 
41 Compare Ergas, above n 31, also pointing to the experience with initial funding of the Internet through 
the US Department of Defence (on the condition that the information be freely published).
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needed and even in economic terms may be undesirable. 42 But at the next level down, 
intellectual property rights still appear to drive the research.  So to take one Australian 
example Florigene, the Australian biotechnology company working on the blue rose, is said 
to spend $2.5 million a year in R&D and hopes to recoup that under the patents it has applied 
for world­wide when a product is eventually launched on the market. 43 Investors argue that 
patent protection is necessary to ensure that innovators and those who invest in innovation 
can capture benefits associated with innovation in these fields to offset the risks and costs of 
the research projects. 44 Yet here also the grant of any intellectual property protection has 
been controversial with a real questioning of whether the benefits of exclusivity provided 
under a patent system are worth the broader social costs (limited access by others for a now 
significant period of up to 20 years – longer possibly for pharmaceutical products, and 
closing off of independent development). 45 And patent theory is yet to offer any clear answer 
to the question of the optimal scope of patent 
42 The arguments here go well beyond the economic arguments that for the fundamental building blocks 
of innovation, government support is preferable to private property rights: discussed by J Stiglitz 
"Knowledge as a Global Public Good" in I Kaul, I Grunberg, M Stern Global Public Goods (UNDP, Oxford 
University Press, 1999) 308, 320. 
43 See "Foreign Partners Help Company to Blossom" in Small Enterprise Business Angels 
<http://www.brw.com.au/root_brw/content/010698/brw27.htm>. 
44 There is no doubt that risk as well as cost is a factor in their assessments: A 1988 study by Venture 
Economics found that US venture capital firms generally rely on a few successful investments to offset 
losses: for 383 investments made by 13 firms from 1969­1985, more than 1/3 ended in absolute loss 
while 6.8% resulted in payoffs greater than 10 times the cost, yielding almost 50% of the end value of 
the firms' portfolios: see O Pfirrmann, U Wupperfeld and J Lerner Venture­Capital and New Technology 
Based Firms (Physica­Verlag, 1997)  42. 
45 Some of the policy issues are canvassed with respect to methods of medical treatment (of uncertain 
patentability under Australian law)  by Finklestein J in Bristol­Myer Squibb Company v FH Faulding & Co 
Ltd (2000) 46 IPR 553 (FCA), 594­6 (only to conclude that the matter should be resolved by Parliament).
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protection with respect to high cost, high risk innovations which may prove to be of 
fundamental social importance. 46 
A fourth trend can be observed at the other end of the spectrum where a massive increase 
in low­level incremental innovation, particularly involving consumer goods and services, 
appears to be driven by substantially larger discretionary income in the western industrial 
world than in earlier generations. 47 As Leaffer comments : 48 
Significant changes in the production and marketing of consumer goods has occurred since the 
1970's.  Formerly, companies seldom revamped their product lines.  The difference today is 
startling.  Take, for example, two heavily advertised products, sneakers and automobiles, and 
consider how many models were available twenty­five years ago for each.  The likely answer is only 
a handful.  Today, in comparison, Nike introduces new sneaker models every six weeks.  Peruse any 
Sunday newspaper supplement and one finds hundreds of models of automobiles for sale. 
As yet, there seems to be no direct source for recouping the investment costs made in 
these innovations (and although trade marks may provide a useful source of reducing at least 
commercialisation costs, the role and function of trade mark law in supporting the 
promotional value of trade marks is still being explored). 49 Patent law sets a high innovation 
46 For standard rationales for patenting, explained in terms of high cost and long­lead time to a 
marketable product, see K Dam, "The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law" (1994) 23 J Leg Stud 247. 
But as yet there is no really coherent theory of the optimal scope of patent protection: see R Merges and 
R Nelson "The Complex Economics of Patent Scope"  (1990) 90 Colum L Rev 839. 
47 It is hard to believe that in the rich countries it was only a century ago that food, clothing and shelter 
absorbed 80% of the average household's consumption: see R Fogel The Fourth Great Awakening and the 
Future of Egalitarianism (U of Chicago Press, 1999). 
48 M Leaffer "The New World of International Trademark Law" (1998) Marq Intell Prop L Rev 1, 5. 
49 See, for instance, the Australian case of Coca­Cola v All­Fect (1999)  47 IPR 481 (FCA) where the famous 
Coca­Cola bottle shape was adopted without authority for the defendant's sweets.  The Full Federal 
Court held there was prima facie trade mark infringement (subject to a defence being established on the 
basis that no confusion would result from the use); see also Campomar v Nike, above n 8, where a 
remedy was granted against the unauthorised use of the Nike label for sports perfumes under the law 
of passing off and under s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).  Interestingly neither of these results 
was premised on trade mark dilution which might lead to even greater protection for promotional 
trade marks: M Richardson "Promotional Trade Marks and Trade Mark Law in Australia: Recent Cases" 
[2000] Ent L Rev 189.
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threshold of inventiveness which low level innovations can hardly meet; 50 design law by its 
terms and in its construction only protects non­functional features of appearance with the 
scope of protection narrowly construed in the cases to require an almost exact imitation. 51 
The unspoken assumption of the courts seems to be that, with no clear justification for 
monopoly rights being granted to low­level functional innovations, the monopoly­based 
legislative regimes should be narrowly construed. 
IV  THE LAW REFORM PROCESS AND ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS 
The legal response to the changing demands wrought by the new innovation practices so 
far has been characterised by two distinct features.  First, a resistance by courts to any 
significant rewriting of the common law and equitable causes of action to provide any 
substantially broader scope of protection, including explicit rejection of a common law 
doctrine of "unfair competition" on a number of occasions. 52 Second, an ever­increasing 
process of piecemeal legislative reform as the various interest groups become active in 
pursuing their particular agendas in the law reform process. 
50 Even reading this in where the statute itself does not appear to provide for it directly: NV Philips  v 
Mirabella International Pty Ltd, above n 3 (the plaintiff's long­life light bulb held non patentable on 
grounds that it failed even the threshold of a "manner of new manufacture" in the Patents Act 1990 
(Cth)).  See also Bristol­Myer Squibb v Faulding, above n 45 (the plaintiff's method for administering taxol 
held to be insufficiently novel even for a petty patent, applying a domestic prior art base).  For the 
generally poor patent infringement success rate in Australian cases briefly documented, see M 
Richardson and S Macchi "Intellectual Property Cases in the Australian High Court: An Economic 
Reappraisal" [1997] 3 EIPR 4. 
51 Notwithstanding that the Designs Act 1906 states that functionality is not a bar to registration, courts 
have consistently construed infringement not to extend to functional features: see for instance 
Firmagroup Ltd v B&D Doors Ltd (1994) 180 CLR 483; Philips Electronics NV v Remington Products 
Australia Pty Ltd (1999) 44 IPR 551 (FCA).  For the poor success rate of design owners in infringement 
cases, see S Ricketson, "Towards a Rational Basis for the Protection of Industrial Design in Australia" 
(1994) 5 AIPJ 193. 
52 The Australian High Court has rejected the desirability of a common law doctrine of "unfair 
competition" on the grounds, inter alia, that competition is generally desirable, an unfair competition 
doctrine would be inconsistent with the limits prescribed in the established causes of action, and its 
application would only lead to uncertain and subjective judgments: Victoria Park Racing and Recreation 
Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479; Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris (No 2) (1984) 156 CLR 
414; Campomar v  Nike International Ltd (2000) 46 IPR 481, 483­4 (HCA).
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A particular example is the recently enacted (but not yet in force) Copyright Amendment 
(Digital Agenda) Act 2000. 53 The primary purpose of this Act, which was sponsored by the 
Attorney­General's Department and the Department of Communications, Information 
Technology and the Arts, is to bolster the strength of copyright protection in digital works, 
particularly for the online environment, and to implement international standards in the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty (1996) and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (1996). 54 Its 
centerpiece is a technology­neutral right of "communication" to the public which will 
supercede the older more technology­specific broadcast and cable­diffusion rights, and is 
framed specifically with communications over the Internet in mind. 55 In addition, it provides 
that the commercial production of or dealing in circumvention devices whose purpose is to 
circumvent or facilitate the circumvention of "technological protection measures" for 
preventing copyright infringement is itself an infringement of copyright, giving rise to civil 
and criminal penalties. 56 The Act is controversial in many respects and its interpretation is 
53 The Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Bill was introduced into the House of Representatives on 
2 September 1999 and referred to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs which tabled its Advisory Report on the Bill on 6 December 1999: see 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/laca/digitalagenda/contents.htm>.  This led to a 
number of amendments.  The Act was finally passed on 17 August 2000 and will come into force on 4 
March 2001, six months after it received Royal Assent.  For prior studies which led to the Bill the 
Copyright Convergence Group Highways to Change: Copyright in the New Communications Environment 
(AGPS, August, 1994) and a Discussion Paper from the Attorney­General's Department on Copyright 
Reform and the Digital Agenda (July, 1997). 
54 See Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Bill:  Explanatory Memorandum, 1­3. 
55 See Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 (Cth), ss 35, 37, 88 and 6 (definition of 
"communicate" as "make available online or electronically transmit … "). 
56 Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 (Cth), ss 98 onwards, inserting a new Division 2A 
("Actions in relation to circumvention devices and electronic rights management information").  A 
"circumvention device" is defined as a "device (including a computer program) having only a limited 
commercially significant purpose or use, or no purpose or use, other than the circumvention or 
facilitating the circumvention, of a technological protection measure": s 4.  A "technological protection 
measure" is, in turn, defined as "a device or product, or a component incorporated into a process, that is 
designed, in the ordinary course of its operation, to prevent or inhibit the infringement of copyright in a 
work or other subject­matter by either or both of the following means: (a) by ensuring that access to the 
work or other subject­matter is available solely by use of an access code or process (including 
decryption, unscrambling or other transformation of the work or other subject­matter) with the 
authority of the owner or licensee of the copyright; (b) through a copy control mechanism":  s 15B.
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still to be finally resolved. 57 But more fundamentally, it does not challenge the scope of the 
copyright model with respect to essentially functional digital works. There must still be an 
original copyright work (or other subject­matter) for protection to arise and rights against 
unauthorised use per se are not granted, with reproduction and specified categories of 
dissemination still the focus of rights. 
A second example is a new Patents Amendment (Innovation Patents) Act 2000 (enacted in 
November and also yet to come into force).  This implements the Australian Council on 
Industrial Property's proposed petty patent reforms aimed at providing an "innovation 
patent" with a lower standard of inventiveness than presently applies. 58 The "innovation" 
new standard is defined simply in terms of a "substantial contribution" made to the working 
of the invention. 59 The difficulty, as pointed out already by commentators, is that in other 
respects the changes would be few.  Importantly, the rights will still be full monopoly rights, 
registration will be a prerequisite for protection, and an 8 year term of protection will apply. 60 
It is not clear at all that low­level functional innovations – which one could imagine others 
might easily independently devise in ignorance of another's pre­existing rights – would 
require such a substantial degree of protection excluding others from exploiting the products 
of their own ingenuity and investment. As such, the likelihood is that courts will, mindful of 
this, continue to interpret the monopoly rights narrowly with rigorous attention paid to their 
standards.    It is questionable whether significant extra protection will – or should ­ be 
available to low level innovation if simply treated as an add­on to the patent system. 61 
57 See, for instance, the Standing Committee report, above n 53, and for a useful commentary and critique, 
K Weatherall "An End to Private Communication in Copyright?  The Expansion of Rights to 
Communicate Works to the Public" [1999] EIPR 342 (Part 1) and 398 (Part 2); Lindsay, above n 33. 
58 Advisory Council on Industrial Property Review of the Petty Patent System (AGPS, 1995). The innovation 
patent system will replace the current petty patent system, see further L Rymer "The Future of 
Industrial Property" (1998) 9 AIPJ 113. 
59 Patents Amendment (Innovation Patents) Act 2000, s 5.  Compare Advisory Council on Industrial 
Property, above n 58, 32, recommendation 2, in effect adopting the expanded novelty test set out in 
Griffin v Isaac (1938) 12 AOJP 739. 
60 Patents Amendment (Innovation Patents) Act 2000, ss 7, 38. 
61 See, for criticisms of the recent United States experience with expansive patenting: see R Merges "As 
Many as Six Impossible Patents  Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent 
System Reform" (1999) 14 Berk Tech LJ 577.
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Anticipated design law reform emerging from an Australian Law Reform Commission 
review will also see some changes made to design law in an effort to provide slightly more 
rigorous standards for registration and, it is hoped, a more generous basis for infringement 
premised on the copyright standard of "substantial similarity" rather than the current design 
standard of imitation. 62 But earlier proposals for a short­term unregistered design right 
(protecting only against reproductions) were abandoned 63 – in part at least, it seemed at the 
time, at the instigation of patent attorneys who feared a reduction in design registrations 
would follow.  Further, the proposals and the reforms that are anticipated as a result of them 
fail to address the problem of providing adequate protection for all features of designs that – 
albeit in a fairly minimal way in terms of the degree of innovation ­ combine both new and 
useful function with an innovative style of presentation.  Again there is no significant 
attention given to whether monopoly rights (to extend for a period of 15 years) are desirable 
for low­level designs, 64 the reforms simply engrafting design law even more closely onto the 
patent model. 65 
Among the most radical and wide­ranging proposals for reform to date is the Copyright 
Law Review Committee's report on Simplification of the Copyright Act 1968. 66 This offers a 
major restructuring and updating of the copyright system devised, in particular, with digital 
information in mind.  Proposals include expanding the fair dealing exceptions into a broader 
exception based on fair use, 67 and transforming the current categories of original "works" and 
other "subject­matters" into "creations" and "productions", each with the own standard of 
62 Australian Law Reform Commission Designs (Report No 74, 1995).  Most of the reforms recommended 
have been accepted by the Government: see Rymer, above n 58. 
63 ALRC Designs (Discussion Paper 58, 1994) ch 12. 
64 Indeed the commissioner responsible for the reference raised this question himself: J Lahore 
"Intellectual Property Rights and Unfair Copying: Old Concepts, New Ideas" [1992] EIPR 428, 430. 
65 ALRC Report above n 62, para [10.7], recommendations 105 and 106.  Note that even TRIPs only 
mandates a 10 year term, and contains no requirement for registered design rights: see arts 25 and 26. 
66 Copyright Law Review Committee Simplification of the Copyright Act: Part 1 Exceptions to the Exclusive 
Rights of Copyright Owners (AGPS, September 1998); Copyright Law Review Committee Simplification of 
the Copyright Act: Part 2 Categorisation of Subject Matter and Exclusive Rights and Other Issues (AGPS, 
February 1999).  For  useful commentary on the proposed changes see S Ricketson and C Cresswell The 
Law of Intellectual Property: Copyright Designs & Confidential Information: Supplement No 1 (LBC Inf 
Services, 2000). 
67 See Simplification of the Copyright Act: Part 1, above n 66, ch 6.
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originality. 68 The current reproduction and distribution rights granted, as well as the 
additional rights anticipated under the Digital Agenda Act, would be renamed "reproduction" 
and "dissemination to the public" and would be supplemented by a new set of "moral rights" 
(as already anticipated in the Copyright (Moral Rights) Bill 1999 (Cth)). 69 But the most 
controversial aspects of the proposed reforms are that the originality standard for a creation 
should be "significant intellectual effort", a standard which looks nearer the most demanding 
European standard than even the United States requirement for more than "sweat of the 
brow", 70 and that the reproduction right in the case of a mere production would be limited to 
literal copying, or "exact reproduction". 71 This raising of the originality threshold for full 
copyright protection to be available could severely restrict the rights available under 
copyright law to digital information products as well as other low­level innovations, such as 
databases, which currently fall within the copyright aegis, raising questions as to the 
incentives for their development. 72 But even this may be too simplistic.  For there may well 
be unanticipated perverse effects from a higher originality standard for copyright if, rather 
than removing intellectual property protection for low level innovations, the result is that 
innovators gravitate even further to other systems (especially given the innovation patent 
reforms).  That the appropriateness of those systems versus copyright is never addressed in 
the CLRC review is a serious problem, if an understandable one given the limited terms of 
reference. 
68 See Simplification of the Copyright Act: Part 2, above n 66,  ch 5.  The term "originality" is avoided, 
however. 
69 Other recommended changes include abolition of the material form requirement, removal of authorial 
references in the current Act, endorsement of the Digital Agenda Bill's technology­neutral right of 
communication, as well as, on the basis that the Copyright Treaty 1996 would be implemented, a right 
of distribution relating to physical embodiments but (as in the US) effectively limited to first sale: see 
Simplification of the Copyright Act: Part 2, above n 66, 71­2 and further, 36­8. 
70 See J Spoor "Copyright Protection and Reverse Engineering of Software: Implementation and Effects of 
the EC Directive" (1994) 19 U Dayton L Rev 1063 and generally, for the European standards, G 
Metaxas­Maranghidis (ed), Intellectual Property Laws of Europe (Chancery Law Publ Ltd, 1995). 
71 This was not a unanimous recommendation: for a strong minority report see: Simplification of the 
Copyright Act Part 2, above n 66, 92­3. 
72 See, for a critique from an economic policy perspective of a higher originality standard, Richardson, 
Ganks, Hanks and Williams, above n 1, 16­21.
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V CONCLUSIONS AND THE FUTURE 
It has been argued in this paper that, while the current sui generis process of intellectual 
property law reform may work well for the most part, it encounters problems when 
innovation practices fundamentally change.  The deeper question is whether a piecemeal law 
reform process that fosters the engrafting of changes onto a disparate range of intellectual 
property rights can fully and efficiently respond to the needs of innovation. 
No easy solutions are available.  For instance, proposals made in the past for a general 
Australian intellectual property law reform commission, 73 while appealing in principle, seem 
unlikely to eventuate in the current political climate and without the right mix of expertise 
and authority in those appointed to the body would not necessarily result in more coherent 
and comprehensive reform (or deliver change at the speed which technological change 
demands) than under the current arrangements. 74 Similarly, the idea of an intellectual 
property code which has occasionally been mooted, although not very seriously, might do 
little more in practice than the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK) – consolidating 
rather than codifying the law in any meaningful way.  Is major change needed anyway if, in 
general, the sui generis process works moderately well?  In many ways it seems to be a 
basically suitable approach for common law jurisdictions which have emphasised the benefits 
of incremental rather than revolutionary change to meet new situations, "muddling along" 
until clearer principles and policies emerge. 
Nevertheless, as the New Zealand Law Commission advocated for New Zealand in its 
report on Intellectual Property Law Reform in 1990, 75 a number of changes to the legislative law 
reform process may be both feasible and effective including: 
73 As, for instance, recommended some eight years ago by S Ricketson, "The Future of Australian 
Intellectual Property Law Reform and Administration"  (1992) 3 AIPJ 3.  See also S Ricketson Intellectual 
Property Administration and Policy in Australia: An Examination of the Australian Situation, Past and Present, 
and Recommendations for Future Change (National Innovation Summit, Melbourne, 9­11 February 2000, 
<http://www.isr.gov.au/industry/summit/>). 
74 The experience with placing design law reform under the aegis of the Australian Law Reform 
Commission, at the beginning touted by some as a possible body to take broader responsibility for 
intellectual property law reform in the future, is salutary in this respect. Although they commented that 
a full review of the need for broader unfair competition laws in Australia was needed (Australian Law 
Reform Commission, above n 62, 5), the report's own recommendations discussed above show all the 
hallmarks of piecemeal sui generis law reform. 
75 Law Commission Intellectual Property: The Context For Reform (Report No 13, 1990) 14­16.
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· a closer working relationship between the different institutions involved in reviewing 
aspects of intellectual property (the coordinated responsibility of the Attorney­ 
General's Department and Department of Communication, Information Technology 
and the Arts for the Digital Agenda Act provides a useful model); 
· contemporaneous treatment of major legislative changes to the various intellectual 
property systems to improve consistency between them (although not, of course, if 
this comes at the expense of achieving reforms in areas where this is urgently 
needed); 
· closer coordination of law reform with efforts overseas to address the same issues 
(something which has already increased substantially through the last decade of law 
reform, fostered by a number of important international conventions on intellectual 
property rights aimed at harmonising national laws, including TRIPs (1994), the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty (1996) and Performances and Phonograms Treaty (1996)). 
In addition there is much to be said for the Commission's proposal that an independent 
advisory body, providing a single disinterested source of advice on intellectual property 
matters, could address some of the problems of sui generis law reform process ­ including the 
absence of  a coherent policy on intellectual property law matters. 76 
But more generally, it is the common law and equitable remedies which seem to be most 
deficient in responding to change and filling the gaps left by the legislative systems which 
being inevitably political respond most easily to organised and vocal interests.  A partial 
solution is broader construction of these doctrines to accommodate new innovation 
practices. 77 New doctrines may also be needed.  So in other jurisdictions an evolving body 
76 Law Commission, above n 75, 15­16.  This has been recommended for Australia on many occasions: see, 
for instance, "The Future of Australian Intellectual Property Law Reform and Administration", above n 
73, 29; Intellectual Property Committee of the Law Council of Australia (Chair S Ricketson) Intellectual 
Property Law Reform and Administration (Canberra, 1992); Intellectual Property Administration and Policy in 
Australia, above n 73,  51 (commenting that the Intellectual Property Consultative Committee 
established in 1991 under the auspices of the Attorney­General's Department and IP Australia, which 
might have had that role, has in practice simply operated as a clearing house for information sharing 
rather than as an agent of unification and coordination of policy). 
77 As I have argued elsewhere: see M Richardson "Breach of Confidence, Surreptitiously or Accidentally 
Obtained Information and Privacy: Theory Versus Law" (1994) 19 MULR 673; M Richardson "Copyright 
in Trade Marks: On Understanding Trade Mark Dilution" [2000] IPQ 66;  M Richardson "Reverse 
Engineering and Optimal Trade Secrecy Protection in the Age of TRIPs" conference paper, Australasian 
Intellectual Property Conference, Coolangatta, 1999.
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of sui generis common law doctrines covering "idea submission", "hot news 
misappropriation", rights of "publicity" and "privacy", 78 and more broadly "parasitic trading" 
and "slavish imitation" 79 combine to provide a more comprehensive set of remedies to 
mediate between the interests of innovators and others.  Hopefully in the future Australian 
courts will address the gaps in their own laws more effectively, drawing on appropriate 
policies and principles, rather than continuing on in the hope that it is for the legislature 
always to adapt its laws to meet new situations and circumstances. 
78 See American Law Institute Restatement  Third of Unfair Competition (1995), pointing out that these have 
superseded the short­lived "unfair competition" doctrine of International News Service v Associated Press 
(1918) 248 US 215 which Australian courts have often pointed to as having suffered an unfortunate 
demise soon after the concept of "reaping without sowing" was enshrined in the US law. 
79 French and German concepts respectively: discussed generally  by A K Sanders Unfair Competition Law: 
The Protection of Intellectual and Industrial Creativity (Clarendon Press, 1997) ch 3.
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APPENDIX I 
Basic Features of the Main Intellectual Property Rights Currently in Force in Australia 
LEGAL 
CATEGORY 
SOURCES OF 
LAW 
SUBJECT 
MATTER 
FORMALITIES TERM INFRINGEMENT/ 
BREACH 
Trade 
secrets 
Equitable 
doctrine of 
breach of 
confidence. 
Also 
contractual 
rights where a 
contract can be 
identified. 
Equitable 
doctrine's 
elements are: 
(1) 
confidential 
information; 
(2) "normally" 
imparted in 
confidence 
(third parties 
also liable and 
some courts 
have accepted 
liability for 
surreptitiously 
obtained 
information); 
(3) 
unauthorised 
use. 
Contract 
defines scope 
of contractual 
rights subject 
to restraint of 
trade doctrine. 
Registration not 
required 
(protection is 
automatic within 
Australia). 
Indefinite so 
long as 
confidentiality 
is maintained 
(or contract 
continues in 
effect). 
Unauthorised use 
of the information. 
The public interest 
provides a basis 
for exception but 
there are very few 
cases and the 
scope and basis is 
unclear.
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LEGAL 
CATEGORY 
SOURCES OF 
LAW 
SUBJECT 
MATTER 
FORMALITIES TERM INFRINGEMENT/ 
BREACH 
Copyright Copyright Act 
1968 (Cth) 
Original 
literary, 
dramatic, 
musical or 
artistic work. 
Subject­matter 
other than 
works, for 
instance 
published 
editions, 
broadcasts, 
television and 
sound 
recordings. 
Performers' 
rights 
Registration not 
required 
(protection is 
automatic within 
Berne jurisdiction 
on making of work 
or other subject 
matter, or the 
performance). 
Works ­ 
generally 50 
years from the 
death of the 
author. 
Other subject­ 
matter ­ 50 
years from 
date made. 
Performers' 
rights – 
generally 20 
years from 
performance. 
Reproduction, 
publication, 
broadcast, 
performance etc of 
work plus limited 
rights re secondary 
distributions. 
Copying, 
broadcast, and 
secondary 
distribution of 
other subject­ 
matter; and 
recording, 
broadcasting of 
performance. 
Exceptions for 
"fair dealings", 
certain specific 
exceptions for 
decompilation of 
computer 
programs, and 
some statutory 
licences provided.
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LEGAL 
CATEGORY 
SOURCES OF 
LAW 
SUBJECT 
MATTER 
FORMALITIES TERM INFRINGEMENT/ 
BREACH 
Patents Patents Act 
1990 (Cth) 
Novel and 
inventive 
"inventions" 
(defined as a 
"manner of 
new 
manufacture") 
which are 
"useful" and 
have not been 
secretly used 
as specified. 
The prior art 
base for 
"standard" 
patents is 
partly 
international; 
for petty 
patents the 
prior art base 
is domestic. 
Registration and 
disclosure 
required for 
protection in 
Australia. 
Standard 
patents ­ 20 
years from 
patent date 
(extension 
permitted for 
pharmaceutica 
l patents). 
Petty patents – 
up to 6 years 
from patent 
sealing. 
Exploitation of 
patented invention 
and importation 
and supply of 
products. 
Very limited 
exceptions. 
Provision allowed 
for compulsory 
licensing of 
unworked 
inventions.
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LEGAL 
CATEGORY 
SOURCES OF 
LAW 
SUBJECT 
MATTER 
FORMALITIES TERM INFRINGEMENT/ 
BREACH 
Designs Designs Act 
1906 (Cth) 
Novel or 
original 
"designs" 
(features of 
shape, 
configuration, 
pattern, 
ornament 
applied to 
articles of 
manufacture) 
– measured 
against 
domestic prior 
art base. 
Registration and 
disclosure 
required for 
protection in 
Australia. 
Term of up to 
16 years from 
date of filing 
date 
(including 2 
renewals). 
Application of 
design or obvious 
or fraudulent 
imitation to an 
article covered by 
registration. 
Limited defences/ 
exceptions.
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LEGAL 
CATEGORY 
SOURCES OF 
LAW 
SUBJECT 
MATTER 
FORMALITIES TERM INFRINGEMENT/ 
BREACH 
Trade Marks Trade Marks 
Act 1995 (Cth) 
Distinctive 
and non­ 
deceptive 
trade marks 
(defined as 
"signs" to be 
used to 
distinguish a 
trader's goods 
or services in 
the market) – 
Must also be 
use or 
intended use 
of the trade 
mark in 
Australia. 
Registration 
required for 
protection in 
Australia (or 
within a 
designated part of 
Australia). 
Term of 10 
years from 
filing date, 
renewable 
unless 
removed for 
non­use or 
cancelled for 
invalidity (inc 
supervening). 
Cancellation 
in few cases 
subject to 
exception 
concerning "no 
act or fault" by 
registered 
owner. 
Use of a 
substantially 
identical or 
deceptively 
similar trade mark 
for registered 
goods or services 
or – in limited 
circumstances ­ 
other goods or 
services (including 
special protection 
against dilution 
for trade marks 
which are well 
known in 
Australia). 
Subject to specific 
exceptions such as 
good faith use of 
own name, honest 
concurrent user.
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LEGAL 
CATEGORY 
SOURCES OF 
LAW 
SUBJECT 
MATTER 
FORMALITIES TERM INFRINGEMENT/ 
BREACH 
Passing off; 
misleading 
or deceptive 
conduct 
Equitable 
doctrine of 
passing off. 
Section 52 
Trade 
Practices Act 
1974 (Cth), 
and provisions 
in State/ and 
Territory Fair 
Trading Acts 
Passing off if 
(1) reputation 
(2) 
misrepresent­ 
ation of an 
association by 
another trader 
likely to 
deceive 
consumers 
and (3) 
damage or 
likely (ie 
imminent) 
damage. 
Section 52 
generally 
concerned 
with 
misleading or 
deceptive 
conduct in 
trade, as are 
provisions in 
State/Territ­ 
ory Fair 
Trading Acts. 
Registration not 
required 
(protection is 
automatic in 
Australia or 
geographic 
region). 
Indefinite 
while 
misrepresent­ 
ation 
continues. 
Any misrepresent­ 
ation of 
association which 
is likely to deceive 
the public but 
more specifically 
effected through 
the adoption of the 
plaintiff's trade 
marks and other 
signs to 
deceptively 
suggest an 
association.
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APPENDIX 2 
Some Anticipated Amendments to the Statutory Systems 80 
LEGAL 
CATEGORY 
SOURCES OF 
REFORM 
SUBJECT MATTER ANTICIPATED REFORMS 
Copyright Copyright 
Amendment 
(Digital 
Agenda) Act 
2000 (Cth) 
Digital works Replace current broadcast and cable 
diffusion rights with a general right of 
"communication" to the public. 
Insert provisions directed at penalising 
commercial manufacture and dealings in 
circumvention devices (designed to avoid 
technological protection measures). 
Copyright 
Amendment 
(Moral Rights) 
Bill 1999 
Moral rights Insert rights of integrity and attribution for 
works and cinematographic films 
CLRC 
Simplification 
Report: Part 1 
Fair Dealing Exceptions Replace current fair dealing exceptions 
with a general open­ended exception for 
fair use.  The current categories of fair 
dealing to be listed as examples. 
80 This table does not include reforms anticipated to be proposed by the Intellectual Property & 
Competition Review Committee in its final report (due end September 2000) but not yet publicly 
released.  In its interim report (April 2000) the Committee made some tentative recommendations 
regarding the statutory provisions regarding parallel imports and s 51(3) of the Trade Practices Act 
1974 (Cth) (allowing limited exemptions to the scope of the trade practices law for intellectual property 
"contracts, arrangements and understandings" made pursuant to the statutory systems).  This was 
followed by the Committee's Report on Parallel Importing under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) issued June 
2000, which recommended repeal of the parallel import provisions in the Act which provide limited 
rights to copyright owners to geographically segment markets.
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LEGAL 
CATEGORY 
SOURCES OF 
REFORM 
SUBJECT MATTER ANTICIPATED REFORMS 
CLRC 
Simplification 
Report: Part 2 
Categorisation of Subject 
Matter, etc 
Remove requirement for "material form", 
remove distinction between works and 
other subject­matter with new categories 
of creations and productions; increase 
originality threshold for "creations" to 
substantial intellectual effort ("labour and 
effort" for productions); rights for creations 
to comprise reproduction, dissemination 
(including Digital Agenda communication 
right and a further secondary distribution 
right if WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996 to be 
implemented) and moral rights; rights 
available to productions are more limited ­ 
exclude non­literal reproductions and 
moral rights. 
Patents Patents Innovation patents. Replace petty patent system with a new 
"innovation patent" with a lower standard 
of innovation defined in terms of 
substantial contribution (prior art base 
international though).  Term of protection 
to be 8 years. 
Designs ALRC report 
on designs 
Designs. Increase threshold requirements for design 
registration to require novelty and 
"distinctiveness" (defined in terms of 
"substantial difference in overall 
appearance" from previous designs). 
Extend infringement to encompass 
substantial similarity. 
Some revision also of the terms of the 
Copyright Act's provisions regarding
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infringement following industrial 
application of a corresponding design (to 
deal with specific drafting problems 
encountered).
